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After the gruesome terrorist attack that killed eighty-four people in 
Nice, many beach towns in France began to ban Muslim women from 
wearing the “burkini” on beaches.1  The burkini, which was created 
by an Australian designer, is modest swimwear that covers the body 
and hair.2  The Nice attack occurred on the heels of a series of attacks 
in France.3  The timing of the French burkini ban suggests it was 
targeting Muslims due to the anger over the attacks.  The argument 
that burkinis are not hygienic is a fig leaf for other more pernicious 
justifications.4  Others argue that religious garb generally contravenes 
the French vision of secularism.5  Another line of attack against the 
burkini relates to gender equality.  For example, the French Prime 
 
* Clinical Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.  Thank you to Professors Michele 
Gilman and Margaret Johnson for inviting me to speak at the annual conference of 
the Center on Applied Feminism.  I am also grateful to the editors of the University 
of Baltimore Law Review for their terrific editorial work.  This article is based on 
chapters from a book I have written, Women’s Human Rights and Migration: Sex-
Selective Abortion Laws in the United States and India (forthcoming 2017). 
1. Sahar Bandial, The Burkini Ban, EXPRESS TRIBUNE: OPINION (Aug. 21, 2016), 
http://tribune.com.pk/story/1166690/the-burkini-ban/; Alan Yuhas et al., Nice 
Attack: Truck Driver Named as France Mourns 84 Killed in Bastille Day Atrocity—
As It Happened, GUARDIAN, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2016/jul/14/nice-bastille-day-france-attack-
promenade-des-anglais-vehicle (last updated July 16, 2016). 
2. Shoba Rao, The Australian Inventor of the Burkini Says Recent Bans on the Swimsuit 




3. Faith Karimi, Attack in Nice: New Terror in France Months After Mass Shooting, 
CNN (July 15, 2016, 8:23 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/15/europe/terror-
attacks-nice-why-france/. 
4. Anya Cordell, Burkini Bans, Muslim ‘Hygiene,’ and the History of the Holocaust, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 25, 2016, 2:51 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/new-kind-of-swimsuit-trauma-i-hatewhat-that-
muslim_us_57b68c08e4b007f18197839f. 
5. Bandial, supra note 1. 
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Minister argues that the burkini reinforces the “enslavement of 
women.”6   
In this article, I will focus on arguments that justify bans on 
Muslim women’s religious clothing on the basis that they are 
oppressive to women.7  In large part, women who wear the full-face 
veil are themselves migrants or the progeny of migrants.  I will 
examine the French debates surrounding the ban of the full-face veil 
in 2010 and the European Court of Human Rights decision that 
upheld that veil ban.8  This discussion illustrates that policymakers, 
feminists and other stakeholders in migrant-receiving countries 
decontextualize immigrant women’s behavior.  That is, their 
understanding that the veil is oppressive to women in France is 
sometimes informed by their understanding of the practice in foreign 
countries.  Decontextualization attributes meaning to a practice that it 
may not have and also fails to recognize the distinct meaning the 
covering gains in France, a region where Islam is a minority religion.   
On the other hand, I will argue that when policymakers in migrant-
receiving countries should be open to the possibility that even if they 
perceive that a practice is oppressive to women in the foreign 
country, they should not automatically assume that the practice 
undermines women’s rights in the migrant-receiving country.9   
Feminist legal theories have been very successful in providing a 
lens to evaluate laws and regulations from the perspective of 
women’s equality.10  However, American feminist legal theory has 
generally not been open to the view that practices can change 
meaning so radically when they are undertaken in different 
geographical contexts.11  This position is understandable because 
 
6. Catie L’Heureux, French Prime Minister Supports Banning the Muslim Burkini, 
Supposedly to Free Women from ‘Enslavement,’ N.Y. MAG. (Aug. 17, 2016, 3:29 
PM), http://nymag.com/thecut/2016/08/french-prime-minister-supports-france-
burkini-ban.html. 
7. Some Muslim women may also wear a loose headscarf, a cloth that covers all the 
hair, or a full-face covering, and it may also include a loose black covering over the 
entire body.  Russell Goldman, What’s That You’re Wearing? A Guide to Muslim 
Veils, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/04/world/what-
in-the-world/burqa-hijab-abaya-chador.html; James Vyver, Explainer: Why Do 
Muslim Women Wear a Burka, Niqab or Hijab?, AUSTL. BROADCASTING CORP., 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-23/why-do-muslim-women-wear-a-burka-
niqab-or-hijab/5761510 (last updated Oct. 2, 2014, 12:19 AM). 
8. See infra Parts IV–V. 
9. See infra Part VI. 
10. Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminist Legal Theory, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER & SOC. 
POL’Y. L. 13, 15 (2005). 
11. See, e.g., Sital Kalantry, Sex Selection in the United States and India: A 
Contextualist Feminist Approach, 18 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 61, 64–65 
(2013) [hereinafter Kalantry I] (“Pro-choice groups have typically taken universal 
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these theories were largely aimed at assessing and addressing 
women’s inequality in one country’s context and developing legal 
remedies to address those harms.12  I build on American feminist 
legal theory to propose a transnational feminist approach. 
The thrust of international human rights theory supports the 
conclusion that if a practice is seen as discriminatory against women 
in one context it will also have the same impact in another context.  
The dominant discourse among scholars and practitioners alike views 
rights as “universal.”13  In other words, if a practice violates a right 
(such as the freedom from gender discrimination) in one country, that 
same practice undertaken in another country is also deemed to violate 
human rights.  In contrast to universality is cultural relativism.14   A 
strong cultural relativist would argue that even traditional or religious 
practices that deprive women of autonomy and equality by most 
objective standards do not contravene human rights.15  Under that 
view, human rights themselves are defined by culture and religion.  
While I disagree with this framing of cultural relativism, I think that 
some practices that are brought by immigrants from one country to 
another cannot simply be explained by universalism.  I call these 
practices “cross-border practices.”  The transnational feminist 
approach I propose opens a theoretical space between cultural 
relativism and universality with the aim of evaluating whether or not 
cross-border practices are oppressive to women.16  In this article, I do 
not draw a conclusion about whether or not France’s full-face veil 
ban adopted in 2010 is consistent with gender equality or is 
 
positions on sex selection bans, arguing that bans on sex selection should not be put 
into place in the United States, India, or elsewhere.”). 
12. See, e.g., id. (“[T]he pro-life movement has been increasingly using information, 
often framed in a distorted way, about the practice and reasons for sex selection 
abortion in foreign countries.”). 
13. See, e.g., What are Human Rights?, U.N. HUM. RTS.: OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER, 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/pages/whatarehumanrights.aspx (last visited Dec. 19, 
2016) (“Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, whatever our 
nationality, place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, 
language, or any other status.”). 
14. Nancy Kim, Toward a Feminist Theory of Human Rights: Straddling the Fence 
Between Western Imperialism and Uncritical Absolutism, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 49, 59 (1993) (“Because the meaning of human rights is substantially different 
from culture to culture, relativists claim that international human rights law is 
meaningless.”). 
15. See Mahnaz Afkhami, Cultural Relativism and Women’s Human Rights, MAHNAZ 
AFKHAMI (Jan. 1, 2000), http://www.mahnazafkhami.net/2000/cultural-relativism-
and-womens-human-rights/. 
16. See infra Parts II–III. 
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oppressive to women.  Rather I demonstrate why a transnational 
feminist framework would be helpful in sorting through that question. 
In Part II, I explain the limitations of feminist legal theories and 
international human rights law in understanding cross-border 
practices.17  In Part III, pushing feminist legal theories in 
transnational directions, I outline the broad features of an approach 
that takes into account both the context of the country of origin and 
country of destination of the migrant.18  In Part IV, I demonstrate 
how arguments in support of a veil ban in France relied on the views 
that the veil is repressive to women in other countries.19  In Part V, I 
explain how the European Court of Human Rights unduly relied on 
justifications for a veil ban from another context when evaluating the 
French veil ban.20  In Part VI, I describe a methodology to evaluate 
veil bans in migrant-receiving countries.21 
II. CONTEXT AND RIGHTS IN FEMINIST LEGAL THEORIES 
AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAWS  
Traditional American feminist legal theories were successfully 
used in the United States to push for women’s equality.  These 
theories emerged to address inequalities in one domestic context—the 
United States.22  Liberal feminists promoted gender-neutral laws in 
all situations without regard to their impact.23  While cultural 
feminists took into account social context, it was always fixed; 
women had certain shared traits (although the traits were different 
from men’s traits).24  Anti-subordination legal theorists also 
emphasized the difference between men and women.25  Yet they 
believed that since men and women were not equal in society, 
treating them the same in the law would not necessarily promote 
equality.26  But again, for these feminists, context is fixed and 
unchanging.27  Consequently, it seems that liberal feminists, cultural 
feminists, and dominance feminists would all agree on one thing: if a 
 
17. See infra Part II. 
18. See infra Part III. 
19. See infra Part IV. 
20. See infra Part V. 
21. See infra Part VI. 
22. See, e.g., Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 21–22 
(1988). 
23. Id. at 22. 
24. Id. at 13. 
25. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 191, 202–03 (1989). 
26. Id. at 201. 
27. See Kalantry I, supra note 11, at 78–79. 
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policy promotes women’s equality in one country’s context, then it 
has the same impact in a different country’s context. 
In addition, international human rights theory and practice also 
suggests that once a practice is determined to be oppressive to 
women in one context, it is presumed to be oppressive when it 
emerges in a totally distinct context of another country.   
A. Context in Traditional Feminist Legal Theories 
Contemporary legal feminism traces its roots to the 1970s, when 
early feminist activists struggled against laws that were formally 
unequal.28  They pushed for women to be able to engage in 
traditionally male-dominated activities.29  Prior to the 1980s, many 
laws contained sex-based distinctions.30  For example, only women 
could receive alimony, only men could be drafted, and the age of 
majority was different for men and women.31  Essentially, laws were 
motivated by the idea that a woman’s appropriate role was in the 
private sphere of family and the home.32  This form of feminism, 
which reacted against such laws, is often referred to as “liberal 
feminism.”33  
In the 1970s, court victories erased many formal gender-based 
distinctions in the law.  One prominent example is the case of Reed v. 
Reed where the U.S. Supreme Court held a statute that permitted only 
men to be executors of an estate unconstitutional.34  It should be 
noted that 1970s feminists would advocate not only for changing 
laws that benefit only men, but also for changing laws that benefit 
only women.  For example, they helped to eradicate the “tender years 
doctrine,” which gave women preference in child custody cases.35  
These feminists emphasized “women’s similarity to men.”36  Most 
liberal feminists would not push the law beyond formal equality with 
men. 
 
28. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 25, at 197. 
29. See id. at 211–12. 
30. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 270 (1979). 
31. See, e.g., id. (questioning whether “Alabama alimony statutes which provide that 
husbands, but not wives, may be required to pay alimony upon divorce” are 
constitutional). 
32. See id. at 279–80. 
33. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 25 (Richard A. 
Epstein et al. eds., 1999). 
34. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971). 
35. See Katharine T. Bartlett & Carol B. Stack, Joint Custody, Feminism, and the 
Dependency Dilemma, in JOINT CUSTODY & SHARED PARENTING 63, 63–87 (Jay 
Folberg ed., 2d ed. 1991). 
36. CHAMALLAS, supra note 33, at 24–25. 
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In liberal feminism, context is nearly irrelevant.  Making laws 
gender neutral and ensuring formal equality is assumed to promote 
women’s equality, regardless of their impact on society.37  That is, 
liberal feminists assumed that giving women the same rights as men 
would translate into women’s equality on the ground level.38  It was 
difficult for them to contend with biological differences where equal 
treatment could be disadvantageous to women.39   
Taking feminism in a new direction, scholars emerging in the 
1980s emphasized women’s differences from men and proposed that 
any evaluation of laws and policies should take that fundamental 
notion into account.40  Taking their cue from Carol Gilligan’s work, 
cultural feminists found that women’s behavioral differences were 
tied to their sex.41  Critics of cultural feminism argue that sex 
“essentializes” women’s behavior.42  While these feminists took into 
account social context, their thinking was always fixed—all women 
shared certain traits that were different from those of men.43 
Anti-subordination legal theorists also emphasized the difference 
between men and women.44  Men’s and women’s different roles and 
privileges in society contributed to women’s inequality.45  If men and 
women were not equal in society, then treating them the same in the 
law would not necessarily promote equality.46  These scholars 
believed that gender was socially constructed rather than fixed.47  
According to a prominent anti-subordination theorist, Catharine 
MacKinnon, women’s inequality in society was the result of 
 
37. See id. at 24. 
38. See id. at 24–25. 
39. Id. at 26. 
40. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 215–16 
(1989). 
41. See, e.g., West, supra note 22, at 16–18. 
42. Verta Taylor & Leila J. Rupp, Women’s Culture and Lesbian Feminist Activism: A 
Reconsideration of Cultural Feminism, 19 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC’Y 
32, 41–42 (1993). 
43. See id. at 41. 
44. See Ruth Colker, The Anti-Subordination Principle: Applications, 3 WIS. WOMEN’S 
L.J. 59, 60 (1987). 
45. See e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White 
Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13, 15 (1991). 
46. Cain, supra note 25, at 201. 
47. MACKINNON, supra note 40, at 113; see Jeffrey Brand-Ballard, Reconstructing 
MacKinnon: Essentialism, Humanism, Feminism, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S 
STUD. 89, 96 (1996) (noting that “[o]ne’s gender . . . is constituted by the role one is 
sexually situated to play in society: to be male is to be socially consigned to sexual 
dominance; to be female is to be socially consigned to sexual subjugation.”). 
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oppression by men, not biology.48  MacKinnon’s approach rejected 
the idea that men and women should be treated identically.49  Instead, 
she believes that in some cases identical treatment can lead to 
subordination.50  Anti-subordination theorists would be willing to 
deviate from formally equal laws if doing so would benefit women in 
practice.51    
For MacKinnon, however, even though the impact of laws must be 
evaluated within context, the context is fixed and unchanging.52  Her 
theory is animated by the assumption that every society is defined by 
male dominance over women.53  In her view, the legal system was 
principally designed to perpetuate male dominance over women.54  
Sexual abuse and sexual relationships were the fundamental ways in 
which women were oppressed.55  Consequently, under dominance 
theory, if a policy promotes women’s equality in one country’s 
context, then it would be assumed to have the same impact in a 
different country’s context.56  Thus, the mainline feminist legal 
theories could not conceive of a practice as contextual—having 
 
48. MACKINNON, supra note 40, at 95 (“[W]omen as a group are dominated by men as a 
group, and therefore as individuals. . . . [W]omen are subordinated in society, not by 
personal nature or by biology.”). 
49. See id. at 226–27 (“Abstract equality necessarily reinforces the inequalities of the 
status quo to the extent that it evenly reflects an unequal social arrangement.”). 
50. See id. at 234 (“The mainstream law of equality assumes that society is already 
fundamentally equal. It gives women legally no more than they already have 
socially, and little it cannot also give men. Actually doing anything for women under 
sex equality law is thus stigmatized as special protection or affirmative action rather 
than simply recognized as nondiscrimination or equality for the first time.”). 
51. See, e.g., West, supra note 22, at 59 (discussing the disparate effects on men and 
women arising from rape law); see also MACKINNON, supra note 40, at 241–42 
(discussing laws that that “purport to protect women as part of the community,” but 
actually serve to subordinate women). 
52. See CHAMALLAS, supra note 33, at 18 (“The theme of some recent feminist 
scholarship can be described as ‘the more things change, the more they stay the 
same.’”). 
53. See MACKINNON, supra note 40, at 237 (arguing that “[l]iberal legalism is . . . a 
medium for making male dominance both invisible and legitimate by adopting the 
male point of view in law at the same time as it enforces that view on society.”). 
54. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflection on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 
1281, 1282–85 (1991). 
55. Deborah Schwenk, Book Review, 12 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 205 (1990) (reviewing 
MACKINNON, supra note 40). 
56. It should be noted that context (though not geographic context) was very important 
to feminist legal methods.  In describing the various feminist legal methods, 
Professor Bartlett discusses context in the following ways: the context of multiple 
identities, the social context, the factual context of a case, the context of community 
norms, and the historical context.  See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal 
Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 849–51, 854 (1990). 
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differing impacts on women’s equality based on the magnitude of the 
practice, social norms of inequality within which the practice 
manifests itself, and other contextual factors.  
B. Context in International Human Rights Law: Universality v. 
Cultural Relativism 
The debate about whether international human rights should apply 
universally across cultures and countries or whether they should vary 
based on culture is age-old.57  In the early 1990s, this binary frame to 
human rights also elicited much debate about women’s rights.58  A 
“strong” cultural relativist would “assert that culture is the sole or 
primary source of the validity of a practice or claim to a moral 
right.”59  The supporters of universalism often draw upon natural law 
and reason and argue that there are objective standards by which to 
judge human conduct and to create law.60  Universalism “assumes 
that there is a law that is so basic, so ‘natural,’ that it exists in all 
communities.”61  
Debates emerged between feminists and cultural relativists—
“[w]hat feminists view as inequality,” a cultural relativist would 
claim “is actually egalitarianism ‘in unfamiliar contexts.’”62  What 
Western feminists may consider oppressive, Western cultural 
relativists may consider cultural preservation.63  For example, much 
feminist debate ensued in the 1990s about whether or not the practice 
of female genital cutting was oppressive to women in Africa.64   
 
57. See generally Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, 6 
HUM. RTS. Q. 400 (1984) (discussing the tension between cultural variability in 
human rights and the universal rights afforded to everyone); John Kleinig, Cultural 
Relativism and Human Rights, in TEACHING HUMAN RIGHTS 111 (A. Tay ed., 1981) 
(reviewing cultural differences throughout history and the effect on universal human 
rights); Christopher C. Joyner & John C. Dettling, Bridging the Cultural Chasm: 
Cultural Relativism and the Future of International Law, 20 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 275 
(1990) (providing a conceptual analysis of cultural relativism by fleshing out the 
problems associated with its nature and the relationship between culture and 
international law); Fernando R. Tesón, International Human Rights and Cultural 
Relativism, 25 VA. J. INT’L L. 869 (1985) (discussing the effects of the 
universalization of the concern for human dignity as international law responds to 
the demands for individual freedom, which challenges state practices reflecting 
geographical and cultural particularities). 
58. See Kim, supra note 14, at 56. 
59. See id. at 56. 
60. Id. at 63–64. 
61. Kim, supra note 14, at 63–64. 
62. Id. at 61.  
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
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Tracy Higgins, a feminist and international human rights legal 
scholar, astutely observed the intervention of anti-essentialist 
feminists in the debates between universalism and cultural relativism 
in international human rights theory and policy.65  She notes the 
parallels in the critiques made by anti-essentialist feminists against 
mainstream feminism to the critiques made by relativists to 
universalism:66 
  Responding to this division, anti-essentialist feminists 
have attempted to rethink both the various descriptions of 
gender oppression that have been offered and the 
assumption that gender oppression can be described 
meaningfully along a single axis. Instead, they have focused 
on local, contextualized problems of gender oppression. In 
this sense, anti-essentialism's criticism of general accounts 
of women’s oppression parallels cultural relativism's 
critique of universal theories of human rights. Like cultural 
relativism, feminist anti-essentialism seems to lead to the 
conclusion that gender inequality cannot be explained cross-
culturally.67 
In observing the challenges in resolving the debate between the 
universalists and relativists, Professor Higgins points out that: 
 Confronted with the challenge of cultural relativism, 
feminism faces divergent paths, neither of which seems to 
lead out of the woods of patriarchy. The first path, leading 
to simple tolerance of cultural difference, is too broad. To 
follow it would require feminists to ignore pervasive limits 
on women’s freedom in the name of an autonomy that exists 
for women in theory only. The other path, leading to 
objective condemnation of cultural practices, is too narrow. 
To follow it would require feminists to dismiss 
the culturally distinct experiences of women as false 
consciousness.68  
She concluded that, “For feminists, the challenge is simultaneously to 
reject universalist human rights claims that fail to account for 
 
65. Tracy E. Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, Relativism, and Human Rights, 19 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 89, 103 (1996).  
66. Id. at 102–03. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 125–26. 
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difference and to embrace a normative conception of gender justice 
that is critical of patriarchy across cultures.”69  I heed her warning.  
My proposal is not a wide-scale rejection of a common notion of 
gender equality; rather, I argue at the margins for some flexibility.  
Moreover, I am asking a different question from those addressed by 
early feminist debates in international human rights.  The question 
those debates revolved around was whether or not a practice was 
repressive to women within the context in which it originated.70  On 
the other hand, the question I ask in this article is whether or not a 
practice that is undertaken in a context other than the one in which it 
originated is oppressive to women.  
These two sets of questions have not always been treated separately 
in international human rights theory.71  Questions about cross-border 
practices (i.e., practices brought from one country to another by 
migrants) have not been distinguished from the questions about 
whether or not human rights are universal or culturally relative.   
Universality has largely won the day in international human rights 
law and practice.72  International human rights organizations are 
reluctant to deviate from the principle of universality, in part, because 
it gives their positions moral authority.73  They may also feel 
uncomfortable taking conflicting positions on the same practice (e.g., 
that veil bans are permissible in one country, but not in another).  
Some scholars and advocates may resist deviating from universality 
as it implies the acceptance of cultural relativism.  For all of these 
reasons, the thrust of international human rights discourse generally 
has not been amenable to the view that a practice could be a human 
rights violation in one context, but not in another.  
C. Context in Karima Bennoune’s Work 
Professor Karima Bennoune’s work pushes against the notion of 
universality.  Focusing on veil bans in Europe, she argues that 
whether or not veil bans are appropriate depends on the context.74  
She points out that her proposal provides “an innovative contextual 
 
69. Id. at 105. 
70. See, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Critiques of International Law and Their 
Critics, 1994–1995 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 1, 13 (1994). 
71. See supra notes 10–16 and accompanying text. 
72. See generally Donnelly, supra note 57 (exploring “several different senses of 
‘universal’ human rights”). 
73. See id. at 291. 
74. Karima Bennoune, Secularism and Human Rights: A Contextual Analysis of 
Headscarves, Religious Expression, and Women’s Equality Under International 
Law, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 367, 371 (2007). 
2017 The French Veil Ban 211 
 
approach to assessing the international legality of bans in public 
schools on ‘modest’ garments claimed to be required by religious 
beliefs for Muslim women.”75  She elaborates that a contextual 
analysis of bans on modest dress of Muslim women would examine a 
range of factors: 
[T]he impact of the garments on other women (or girls) in 
the same environment; coercion of women in the context, 
including activities of religious extremist organizations; 
gender discrimination; related violence against women in 
the location; the motivation of those imposing the 
restriction; Islamophobia, if relevant, or religious 
discrimination in the context; the alternatives to restrictions; 
the possible consequences for human rights both of 
restrictions and a lack thereof; and whether or not there has 
been consultation with impacted constituencies (both those 
impacted by restrictions and by a lack of restrictions on such 
garments), and, if so, what their views are.76 
She examines two court decisions—the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) judgment in Sahin v. Turkey (2004)77 and the British 
House of Lords judgment in Begum v. Headteacher.78  In Sahin, the 
ECHR held that Turkey’s ban on the headscarf in universities did not 
violate the European Convention on Human Rights’ guarantee of 
religious expression.79  On the other hand, in Begum, the House of 
Lords upheld a school’s ban on the jilbab, which is a long cloak 
covering everything but the head, hands, and feet.80  While she 
appears to be open to the possibility that veil bans are impermissible 
in some countries but not in others, Bennoune finds the bans to be 
justified in both countries she considered—Turkey and the U.K.81 
In Sahin, the issue before the ECHR was whether the Turkish ban 
violated a woman’s right to free expression under the European 
Convention of Human Rights (“Convention”).82  Under the 
Convention, this right can be limited in order to protect the rights of 
 
75. Id. at 367. 
76. Id. at 396. 
77. Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004), aff'd, App. No. 44774/98, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005).  
78. R v. Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15 (HL) 
(appeal taken from Eng.). 
79. Sahin, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 3–4. 
80. Bennoune, supra note 74, at 410. 
81. See id. at 414–15.  
82. Sahin, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1. 
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others.83  Bennoune asserts that the Turkish ban was appropriate 
because “[e]ven to the extent that for some women, the choice to 
wear a headscarf is their own, and is for them an expression of 
religious belief, this limitation on that choice is necessary in context 
to protect the rights of others.”84  
She also concludes that the ban in the United Kingdom on the more 
restrictive clothing was appropriate in a situation where a less 
restrictive headscarf was still available and where there was evidence 
that some girls would have felt coerced into wearing the restrictive 
dress if it were not banned.85  Bennoune points out that her 
conclusion that the bans were appropriate in both Turkey and the 
U.K. cases hinges upon the fact that they were in “public educational 
institutions, which shape the identities of future generations and forge 
the public consensus about gender roles and equality.”86 
On the other hand, she argues that while bans in Turkey and the 
U.K. were appropriate, it would be inappropriate to ban it in the 
American law school where she teaches because so few women wear 
them.87  The magnitude of the practice in the context in which it 
occurs appears to be an important consideration in determining 
whether to ban it.88  Even though she believes both bans in Turkey 
and the U.K. were appropriate, her contextual approach in evaluating 
bans leaves open the possibility that in some contexts, veil bans may 
not be appropriate.89  Bennoune also briefly discusses France’s 2004 
law restricting religious dress in schools, but does not draw any 
conclusions about its legitimacy.90  She notes that “[t]he French law 
perches in between as a truly hard case.”91  In Part IV, I discuss 
France’s full-face ban adopted in 2010, three years after the 
publication of Bennoune’s article.  I build on Bennoune’s approach to 
veil bans to develop a methodology for evaluating the human rights 
consequences of veil bans. 
 
83. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter Convention]. 
84. Bennoune, supra note 74, at 386. 
85. Id. at 412–13. 
86. Id. at 386. 
87. Id. at 389–90. 
88. Id. at 396. 
89. See id. at 416. 
90. Id. at 413–16. 
91. Id. at 416. 
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III. TRANSNATIONAL FEMINIST LEGAL APPROACH TO 
CROSS-BORDER PRACTICES   
As described above, American feminist legal theory has generally 
taken a universal understanding to rights: if a practice is viewed as 
harmful to women in one country context, it will also be assumed to 
be harmful to women in another country context.92  Similarly, under 
international human rights doctrine, there are two main ways to 
understand human rights: universal or culturally relative.93  The 
principle of universality—that everyone essentially has the same 
human rights everywhere—has won the day among modern human 
rights organizations, institutions, and scholarship.94  Any deviation 
from universality is thought to be an argument in favor of cultural 
relativism.95  Under the extreme version of cultural relativism, human 
rights gain meaning from religious and cultural values in any given 
society.96  Something is considered a human right in any given 
society only if it is consistent with cultural values.97  
I argue for a position somewhere between those polar opposites.98  
I propose a transnational feminist legal approach to cross-border 
practices, which recognizes that a practice can contravene women’s 
equality in one social and country context, but may not have the same 
impact in another.  Some practices change meaning over time and in 
different social, historical, political, and other contexts.99  I developed 
this transnational feminist methodology in greater depth elsewhere100 
 
92. See Kim, supra note 14, at 49–50. 
93. Higgins, supra note 65, at 93. 
94. Kim, supra note 14, at 63–64. 
95. See Higgins, supra note 65, at 91. 
96. Kim, supra note 14, at 56, 58–59. 
97. See generally Donnelly, supra note 57, at 411 (“Human rights are inherently 
‘individualistic’; they are rights held by individuals in relation to, even against, the 
state and society.”). 
98. See, e.g., Kalantry I, supra note 11, at 64–65 (proposing a contextualized feminist 
approach while discussing the legality of sex-selective abortion); SITAL KALANTRY, 
WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS AND MIGRATION: SEX-SELECTIVE ABORTION LAWS IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND INDIA (forthcoming 2017) [hereinafter KALANTRY II]. 
99. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 56, at 877–78 (“[T]he postmodern view posits that the 
realities experienced by the subject are not in any way transcendent or 
representational, but rather particular and fluctuating, constituted within a complex 
set of social contexts.  Within this position, being human, or female, is strictly a 
matter of social, historical, and cultural construction.”). 
100. See, e.g., Kalantry I, supra note 11, at 64–65 (proposing a contextuali zed feminist 
approach while discussing the legality of sex-selective abortion); KALANTRY II, 
supra note 98. 
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and have examined sex-selective abortion bans through the lens of 
this framework.101    
I want to be clear that I am not arguing that all cross-border 
practices are consistent with women’s equality or that none of them 
should be prohibited.  Nor am I arguing that all cross-border practices 
are morally acceptable.  I am simply suggesting that we need to be 
open to the possibility that a cross-border practice, although harmful 
to women in one country, may not be oppressive when undertaken in 
another country. 
It is important to make this distinction because, in some cases, bans 
on a practice that are justified for the sake of promoting women’s 
equality do not necessarily promote equality, but rather only restrict 
other rights of women.102  For example, bans on sex-selective 
abortion burden reproductive rights and bans on veils impinge on free 
exercise of religion.103  In weighing costs and benefits of bans on 
cross-border practices, people in migrant-receiving countries may 
erroneously overvalue the negative impact of the practice, 
particularly if they assume that the consequences of the practice are 
the same in their own country as they are in the country of origin of 
the immigrant.   
American feminist legal theory might suggest that we need only 
focus on the context where a regulation is being considered (i.e., the 
migrant-receiving country).  On the other hand, international human 
rights law and theory shines light on the context where the practice 
first emerged and was first labeled as oppressive to women (i.e., the 
migrant-sending country).  
The insights in the field of transnational law draw attention to the 
importance of both the migrant-receiving and migrant-sending 
contexts in evaluating whether a regulation by a migrant-receiving 
country on immigrant women’s behavior will promote equality or 
contravene it.  Transnational law is distinct from international law, 
which governs the relationships between countries.  Transnational 
law highlights the interactions of domestic laws in the increasingly 
global web of connections among people, corporations, as well as 
goods, services, and knowledge.  Consequently, a transnational 
 
101. See Kalantry I, supra note 11, at 79; KALANTRY II, supra note 98.  See generally 
Sital Kalantry, Sex-Selective Abortion Bans: Anti-Immigration or Anti-Abortion?, 16 
GEO. J. INT’L AFF. 140 (2015) (discussing sex selection bans and their perceptions 
over time). 
102. Kalantry I, supra note 11, at 78–80. 
103. See id. at 64; Adrien Katherine Wing & Monica Nigh Smith, Critical Race Feminism 
Lifts the Veil?: Muslim Women, France, and the Headscarf Ban, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 743, 757 (2006). 
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approach encourages us to focus on multiple contexts in evaluating a 
ban in one country. 
In the migrant-receiving country, researchers and policymakers 
should examine the gendered nature of social institutions, the historic 
subjugation and inequality of women, and other factors that give 
meaning to the practice as discriminatory to women in the migrant-
receiving country.  Researchers should also investigate the scope and 
magnitude of the cross-border practice in question. 
The migrant-receiving country context should also be examined in 
detail.  Researchers should attempt to determine how widespread the 
practice is in that country.  What are the individual motives for 
women who undertake it?  What societal institutions contribute to 
giving meaning to the practice as discriminatory?   
After understanding the practices in the two contexts (the context 
where the practice is carried out by migrants and the context where 
the practice has longer historical roots), I propose a comparative 
study of these contexts.  Do women undertake the practice at the 
same rate?  Do the same social institutions that contribute to the 
practice exist in the country of destination?  What (if any) societal 
factors present in the migrant-receiving country that give rise to the 
practice that are in fact not present in the migrant-sending country?  
Are there different factors in the migrant-receiving country that 
explain the reasons for the practice?  Through this comparative study, 
we can better determine the human rights impact of the practice in the 
migrant-receiving countries.  
In evaluating bans on cross-border practices, I caution 
policymakers, feminists, voters, and others from relying too heavily 
on the context of a foreign country in understanding a practice in 
their own country even when it is undertaken by migrants from that 
foreign country.  At the same time, the context of the foreign country 
cannot be ignored.  It is important to understand the scope, results, 
and causes of the same practice in another country and to compare 
them to the scope, results, and causes of the practice in the migrant-
receiving country.  By doing this, we are able to determine whether 
or not the factors that contribute to making a practice oppressive in 
one context are also present in another country’s context.   
Additionally, I encourage people in migrant-receiving countries 
who think otherwise to recognize that culture is not fixed in time and 
space and that it is not the sole driver for the behavior of immigrants 
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in their country.104  Instead, motives for the behavior of immigrants 
in the country of destination may be different than the motives for the 
same behaviors in the country of origin of the migrant.105  
Policymakers, feminists, and stakeholders should seek to understand 
from women who engage in the practice their reasons for doing so.  
For example, when veil-wearers in France were asked why they wore 
the veil, some women said they do so as an assertion of their identity 
in a country where they are a minority, not because they are forced to 
do it.106   
Finally, in evaluating restrictions on cross-border practices, 
policymakers should be open to the possibility that a practice that 
seems oppressive to women in one country is not oppressive in 
another country.  Failure to consider the contextual nature of cross-
border practices means that in the name of promoting gender 
equality, in some cases migrant-receiving countries are adopting 
prohibitions that trample on the rights of immigrant women.  
In the next section, I demonstrate how policymakers, feminists, and 
others in France relied on information and their knowledge about the 
practice of veiling in foreign countries to support a ban on veils that 
cover a woman’s face in France. 
IV. DECONTEXTUALIZATION IN THE FULL-FACE VEIL BAN 
DISCOURSE IN FRANCE  
In this section, I describe how behavior, motives, and harms were 
decontextualized in the debates around the banning of the full-face 
veil in France.  I refer to “decontextualization” as taking information 
about certain groups of people whose behaviors, motives, and 
attitudes are shaped by and respond to a certain political, historical, 
economic, and social context and then transposing that information to 
another group of people who live in a completely different context.107  
In 2004, France prohibited girls from wearing headscarves in 
schools.108  Six years later, in 2010, France banned women from 
 
104. See generally Francine D. Blau, Immigrants and Gender Roles: Assimilation vs. 
Culture (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 9534, 2015), 
http://ftp.iza.org/dp9534.pdf (discussing the influence of culture on immigrant 
women’s behavior). 
105. See, e.g., Kalantry I, supra note 11, at 78 (proposing a “country-by-country” 
approach to sex selection). 
106. JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, THE POLITICS OF THE VEIL 137 (Ruth O’Brien ed., 2007). 
107. See infra Part V. 
108. Loi n° 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le 
 port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles,  
 collèges et lycées publics [Law 2004-228 of Mar. 15, 2004], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE 
LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar. 17, 2004, p. 
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covering their full faces in public spaces.109  The text of the law did 
not specifically target Muslims, but it was clear that it was meant to 
address their veils.110  The law applies only to full-face coverings and 
states that “[n]o one may, in public places, wear clothing designed to 
conceal the face.”111  These bans are largely justified in terms of 
women’s equality.112 
Some might believe that veil bans are motivated primarily by an 
animus towards Muslims and that women’s equality is merely a 
secondary concern or a pretext.113  To these people, women’s equality 
arguments are deployed as a strategy to gain support for the ban.114  
Even if that is true, many people who are not primarily motivated by 
racial or anti-Muslim bias support the veil ban.115  In France, many 
veil-ban advocates truly believe that the veil is oppressive to 
women.116  The trouble is that rampant reference to other contexts 
clouds an accurate understanding of the situation in France.  
During the discussions surrounding the veil ban, the perception of 
the magnitude of the practice was greater than the reality.  One of the 
justifications for the ban was safety: it was necessary to protect the 
public.117  The French government argued that veiled women could 
commit identity fraud by covering their faces.118  France could only 
have been concerned about public safety if policymakers thought that 
people were veiling in great numbers.  However, the reality is that 
 
5190.  The House of Representatives has translated this law as follows: “in schools, 
junior high schools and high schools, signs and dress that conspicuously show the 
religious affiliation of students are forbidden.” H.R. Res. 528, 108th Cong. (2004), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/108th-congress/house-resolution/528/text.  
109. Jennifer Heider, Unveiling the Truth Behind the French Burqa Ban: The 
Unwarranted Restriction of the Right to Freedom of Religion and the European 
Court of Human Rights, 22 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 93, 93 & n.7 (2012). 
110. Id. at 95. 
111. Loi n° 2010-776 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace 
public [Law 2010-1192 of 11 October 2010 on the Prohibition on the Concealment 
of the Face in Public], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] 
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Oct. 12, 2010, p. 18344, translated in S.A.S. v. 
France, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 341, ¶ 74. 
112. See Heider, supra note 109, at 116–17. 
113. See, e.g., Bennoune, supra note 74, at 394 (justifying veil bans by citing women’s 
rights, when Islamophobia is the real motivation). 
114. See, e.g., id. (“Some [human rights advocates] seem to be less willing to decry 
violations of women’s human rights, in the Muslim world and Muslim communities, 
including those that involve pressure to wear ‘modest’ dress, because of the rise in 
prejudice against Muslims and Islam.”). 
115. See Heider, supra note 109, at 93. 
116. S.A.S. v. France, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 341, ¶ 25. 
117. Id. ¶ 82. 
118. Id. 
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very few women were wearing the full-face veil in France at the time 
of the ban. 
Indeed, a study cited by the European Court of Human Rights 
found that only 1900 women in France wore the full-face covering.119  
It seems that people who pushed for the law assumed that because 
women in some Muslim countries wear the veil, many Muslim 
women living in France may also be veiling.120  Perhaps this 
assumption developed in response to a growing Muslim immigrant 
population in France.121  Contrary to widespread assumptions, 
however, empirical studies have found that the face veil is not worn 
exclusively by recent immigrants.122  European-born women—
women who have lived in Europe most of their lives—and European 
religious converts both were shown to wear face veils.123  
Alternatively, the rationale could have been symbolic: policymakers 
wanted to take a stand against a practice they found to be oppressive 
even though proponents of the practice claimed it was part of their 
religion. 
Eva Brems, a human rights professor at Ghent University, points 
out that women who wore the veil were rarely consulted about their 
reasons for wearing it.124  When the Parliamentary Commission of 
Inquiry in France evaluated the ban, it “heard about 200 witnesses 
and experts.”125  The Commission “sent out questionnaires to several 
French Embassies.”126  But it failed to seek out a single woman who 
 
119. Id. ¶ 145. 
120. See generally id. ¶ 16 (demonstrating that the belief that a majority of Muslim 
women in France wear a full-face veil is inaccurate because the veil “was a recent 
phenomenon in France” and was worn only by an estimated 1,900 women). 
121. See Adam Taylor, Map: France’s Growing Muslim Population, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/01/09/map-
frances-growing-muslim-population/; PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR., THE FUTURE OF THE GLOBAL MUSLIM POPULATION 127, 130 (2011), 
http://www.pewforum.org/files/2011/01/FutureGlobalMuslimPopulation-WebPDF-
Feb10.pdf. 
122. Eva Brems, Introduction to the Volume, in THE EXPERIENCES OF FACE VEIL 
WEARERS IN EUROPE AND THE LAW 13 (Eva Brems ed., 2014) [hereinafter Brems I]. 
123. See id.; A Voice Behind the Veil: Planning to Defy a French Law, TIME, 
http://content.time.com/time/video/player/0,32068,753330077001_2042878,00.html 
(last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (interviewing a Muslim woman who was born and raised 
in France that chose to wear a face veil because of her spirituality). 
124. See Brems I, supra note 122, at 2–3. 
125. Eva Brems, Face Veil Bans in the European Court of Human Rights: The 
Importance of Empirical Findings, 22 J.L. & POL’Y 517, 517–18 (2014) [hereinafter 
Brems II]. 
126. Id. 
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actually wore a face veil.127  The lone exception was one woman, 
who appeared before the Commission at her own request.128   
Some people perceive that women in foreign countries are forced 
or coerced to wear veils.129  Instead of conducting empirical research 
about why women veiled in France, some people may have relied on 
their understanding of the reasons for veiling in foreign countries.  
Moreover, many scholars have argued against the coercion narrative 
that prevails about veiling.  Saba Mahmood, for example, has pointed 
out that wearing the veil is empowering to women even in countries 
where it is common practice.130  Leila Ahmed’s work about the 
resurgence of the veil also notes that for many women it is 
voluntary.131 
The narrative that Muslim women are coerced to wear a veil in 
Islamic countries is then projected onto Muslim women living in 
France.  According to Joan Scott’s work, The Politics of the Veil, 
“two investigative bodies [were] appointed to look into the issue of 
headscarves in public schools.”132  They found that wearing 
headscarves was “either . . . a denial of freedom or a loss of 
reason.”133  Scott notes that, in the French debate, the veil has never 
been seen as “reasonable choice.”134  While the investigative bodies 
admitted that “a few (certains) girls considered the veil a means of 
emancipation, the National Assembly study group insisted that many 
more (beaucoup) felt it oppressive.”135  According to psychoanalyst 
Elisabeth Roudinesco, the veil was thought to be a “curtain” that 
shrouds young girls in silence.136  Of course, as Scott points out, there 
was no actual data to support the claim.137  The coercion narrative 
also underlays the 2010 law, which contains a provision punishing 
people who force a woman to conceal her face.138  There are probably 
 
127. Brems I, supra note 122, at 2–3. 
128. Brems II, supra note 125, at 517–18. 
129. Id. at 533. 
130. SABA MAHMOOD, POLITICS OF PIETY: THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL AND THE FEMINIST 
SUBJECT 16 (2005).   
131. LEILA AHMED, A QUIET REVOLUTION: THE VEIL’S RESURGENCE, FROM THE MIDDLE 
EAST TO AMERICA 119 (2011). 
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137. Id. at 129. 
138. Law 2010-1192 of Oct. 11 2010, art. 4 (Fr.). 
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women who wear the face veil due to overt or implicit coercion, but 
those situations are overstated in the debates.139  
The coercion narrative prevailed in France despite the fact that 
many Muslim women argued that they wore the veil because of 
“individual choice and not community pressure.”140  Women who 
wore the veil in France also pointed out that they wore it for different 
reasons than women in Muslim-majority countries.141  In interviews, 
girls said they wore veils as an expression of self-identity in a country 
where they are a minority.142  Some women wore the veil precisely 
because it was used to discriminate against Muslims in France.143  By 
embracing a symbol that was used to discriminate against them, they 
lessened the power of its oppression.144  It should be noted that not all 
Muslim women oppose the ban.145  Some French Muslim women’s 
rights activists agree that the veil is “a tool of oppression, alienation, 
discrimination, and an instrument of men’s power over women.”146  
Unlike countries where the veil is required by law or by social 
pressure, women in France are exposed to the view that the veil is 
contrary to gender equality.147  While in some countries there may be 
societal pressure to veil, in France the mainstream societal pressure is 
the opposite.148  The only pressure to veil (if at all) in France would 
be from family, relatives, and other friends with the same beliefs.149  
Although this pressure can be significant, it is not the same as the 
pressure to conform to societal norms in countries where veiling is 
widespread.  
 
139. SCOTT, supra note 106, at 131. 
140. Id. at 135. 
141. See id. at 136–37. 
142. See id. at 137. 
143. See id. at 138–39. 
144. See id. at 139. 
145. See id. at 14. 
146. Bennoune, supra note 74, at 391 (quoting FADELA AMARA, BREAKING THE SILENCE: 
FRENCH WOMEN’S VOICES FROM THE GHETTO 100 (Helen Harden Chenut trans., 
Univ. Cal. Press, 2006) (2003)). 
147. See SCOTT, supra note 106, at 153–54. 
148. See Widespread Support for Banning Full Islamic Veil in Western Europe, PEW 
RES. CTR. (July 8, 2010), http://www.pewglobal.org/2010/07/08/widespread-
support-for-banning-full-islamic-veil-in-western-europe/. 
149. See generally Kim Willsher, French Muslim Women on Burqa Ban Ruling: ‘All I 
Want Is to Live in Peace,’ GUARDIAN (July 1, 2014, 2:26 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/01/french-muslim-women-burqa-ban-
ruling (“[S]he had suffered ‘absolutely no pressure’ from her family or relatives to 
wear the burqa and was prepared to uncover her face for identity checks, but insisted 
on the right to wear the veil.”). 
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Moreover, in many other countries, such as Iran, women are 
required to wear some form of veil by law.150  By comparing the 
French situation to those countries, we are not able to clearly 
understand the reasons women in France veil.  It is fair to say that a 
law that makes the veil mandatory is coercive.  But it is problematic 
to assume that it is coercive in France just because of the context 
countries.  
Many argued that women who claimed to veil voluntarily were 
under a “false consciousness” or duped by their own religion.151  The 
Constitutional Court of Belgium’s decision in upholding the veil ban 
in Belgium exemplifies this position:  
 Even where the wearing of the full-face veil is the result of 
a deliberate choice on the part of the woman, the principle 
of gender equality, which the legislature has rightly 
regarded as a fundamental value of democratic society, 
justifies the opposition by the State, in the public sphere, to 
the manifestation of a religious conviction by conduct that 
cannot be reconciled with this principle of gender 
equality. . . . [T]he wearing of a full-face veil deprives 
women – to whom this requirement is solely applicable – of 
a fundamental element of their individuality which is 
indispensable for living in society and for the establishment 
of social contacts.152  
The court argued that even in respect of women who chose to veil 
themselves, they were denying themselves gender equality.153  By 
this argument, the court imposed its version of gender equality on all 
 
150. Ramin Mostaghim, Protest over Islamic Dress Code Clogs Tehran Streets, L.A. 
TIMES (May 7, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-
iran-dress-code-protest-20140507-story.html; Swati Sharma, MAP: Where Islamic 
Veils Are Banned – and Where They Are Mandatory, WASH. POST (July 1, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/07/01/map-where-
islamic-veils-are-banned-and-where-they-are-mandatory/. 
151. See William Langley, France’s Burka Ban is a Victory for Tolerance, TELEGRAPH 
(Oct. 21, 2014, 7:30 AM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/8444177/BurkaFranceNa
tional-FrontMarine-Le-PenMuslimFadela-AmaraAndre-Gerinhijab.html; Daniel 
Weinstock - Feminism, the Veil, and the Problem of False Consciousness (ASI 2014), 
MCGILL: BLOGS (July 18, 2014, 8:42 PM), 
http://blogs.mcgill.ca/tcpsych/2014/07/18/daniel-weinstock-feminism-the-veil-and-
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152. S.A.S. v. France, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 341, ¶ 42 (emphasis added). 
153. See id. 
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women and disregarded women’s decisions about their competing 
priorities (e.g., the right to religion, right to identity, gender equality, 
etc.) that are at stake in the decision to wear the veil.154 
The idea that Muslim women who veil themselves have no agency 
was recently articulated by Laurence Rossignol, the French minister 
of women’s rights, in a controversy around women’s fashion.155  
Objecting to designer labels that have begun to create modest dress 
for women, including fashion styles that cover a woman’s hair, Ms. 
Rossignol argued that “[w]hen brands invest in this Islamic garment 
market, they are shirking their responsibilities and are promoting 
women’s bodies being locked up.”156  She then compared Muslim 
women to “consenting slaves,” but later recanted that part of her 
statement.157  As noted above, after the brutal massacre by a terrorist 
in Nice, France, many French cities have begun to ban modest 
swimwear that Muslim women wear, known as the “burkini.”158 
In addition to ascribing motives based on their understanding in 
foreign countries, some people in France also assumed that the 
consequences of allowing women to veil in France would be similar 
to those in foreign countries.159  Caroline Fourest, a leading supporter 
of the headscarf ban in schools, insists that “Islamists were engaged 
in a political conspiracy the aim of which was the oppression of 
women and the elimination of secularism—in short, that the 
experience of Iran was about to be imported into France.” 160  The 
claim, therefore, was that the veil was part of the oppression of 
women in Iran and that oppression would be replicated in France.161  
In this section, I have shown how perceptions about why women veil 
in other countries (which themselves were sometimes inaccurate) 
were used to further bans on veiling in France.  With the emphasis on 
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how the veil may be used as a tool of oppression by some 
governments, the voices of women in France who claim the veil as an 
expression of religion and identity were sidelined.  In the next 
section, I discuss how the European Court of Human Rights opinion 
upholding France’s full-face veil ban relied on its decision about a 
veil ban in a Muslim-majority country. 
V. DECONTEXTUALIZATION AND THE EUROPEAN COURT 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS DECISION ON FRANCE’S FULL-
FACE VEIL BAN 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR or court) reviews 
petitions brought by individuals against countries that are signatories 
to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention) alleging violations under 
the Convention.162  In 2011, a French woman brought a petition to the 
ECHR arguing that France’s full-face veil ban discussed above 
violates a number of provisions of the Convention.163  The main 
claim the ECHR opinion focused on was whether the French veil ban 
violates a woman’s right to express her religious views.164  I 
demonstrate how the court referred to a case from another context 
(Turkey) in justifying its decision to uphold the French veil ban.165  I 
argue that it relied too heavily on justifications for a veil ban in 
another context in making a decision to uphold the ban in France. 
Article 9 of the Convention states that everyone has the “[f]reedom 
to manifest one’s religion or beliefs.”166  The ECHR agreed that the 
petitioner was indeed exercising her religious beliefs when she chose 
to wear the veil (which she noted she did only occasionally).167  But 
this right is not without limit in the Convention.  The exercise of 
one’s religion can be limited by the state if “necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety 
or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”168  France offered a 
number of reasons for the limitation, including a public safety 
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rationale.169  The court rejected the public safety rationale because it 
found that the state could simply require women to remove their 
coverings when needed to verify their identities and that there was no 
other general public safety threat being caused by women wearing 
veils.170   
The court also rejected gender equality as an appropriate reason to 
limit exercise of religious liberty because the petitioner who was 
asking for the right to veil was a woman.171  The court noted that 
“[France] cannot invoke gender equality in order to ban a practice 
that is defended by women—such as the applicant.”172  In rejecting 
gender equality as a rationale, the court avoided the objectionable 
presumption that women who veil do so because they are duped or 
have a “false consciousness.”173 
But the court did find one justification offered by France to be 
persuasive. It found that wearing the veil contravenes the notion of 
“living together.”174  The court stated: 
[It] takes into account the respondent State’s point that the 
face plays an important role in social interaction. It can 
understand the view that individuals who are present in 
places open to all may not wish to see practices or attitudes 
developing there which would fundamentally call into 
question the possibility of open interpersonal relationships, 
which, by virtue of an established consensus, forms an 
indispensable element of community life within the society 
in question. The Court is therefore able to accept that the 
barrier raised against others by a veil concealing the face is 
perceived by the respondent State as breaching the right of 
others to live in a space of socialisation which makes living 
together easier.175  
The court further pointed out that: “From that perspective, the 
respondent State is seeking to protect a principle of interaction 
between individuals, which in its view is essential for the expression 
not only of pluralism, but also of tolerance and broadmindedness 
without which there is no democratic society.”176 
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The court reasoned that although wearing the face veil was a valid 
exercise of the freedom of religion guaranteed under the Convention, 
the veil prevented people in France from living together.177  It further 
found that “living together” was an element of the “protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others,” which is a valid reason under the 
Convention for a state to limit a person’s exercise of religion.178  The 
court allowed for restrictions on religious freedom even if, in 
exercising his or her religious freedom, a person infringes upon 
others’ rights by creating barriers to interactions between people.179   
The dissent was quick to point out that “[t]he very general concept 
of ‘living together’ does not fall directly under any of the rights and 
[guarantees] . . . within the Convention.”180  Eva Brems is even more 
pointed—she correctly argues that there is no legal right to “see the 
face of others in a public space.”181  She further points out that in her 
empirical study she found that veil-wearers reported to have 
significant public exchanges and connections.182  She reports that 
many women she interviewed expressed a self-image that included 
them as open or sociable persons.183  The women felt communication 
was possible even when wearing a full-face veil.184  The idea of 
equating social exchange with “face-to-face” interactions is a 
Western cultural notion.185    
The court essentially found that the concept, “living together,” 
which does not even rise to the level of a right, trumps another 
person’s fundamental right to religious expression.186  Upon finding 
that limiting the religious exercise of face veil wearers was 
permissible under the Convention, the court then gave wide latitude 
and deference to France’s interpretation by using a doctrine called 
“margin of appreciation.”187  This doctrine gives countries great 
discretion in adopting laws in “grey areas” where there is not a clear 
contravention of the Convention.188  
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However, in this balancing of rights, it does not seem appropriate 
to deny someone her right to religion (which is an established 
fundamental and human right in most jurisdictions, including under 
the European Convention on Human Rights) in favor of others who 
feel they are not able to “live together” with someone who is 
covering her face.  The court accepted a weak justification for the 
law.  It may have done so because it agrees that full-face veil bans 
promote women’s equality.  However, it may not have wanted to 
explicitly articulate that position because then it would be implying 
the woman who was challenging the veil ban was under a “false 
consciousness” or duped by her religion.189 
In holding in favor of France, the court refused to follow other 
commentators who noted that the veil ban contravened the 
Convention.190  For example, it rejected the viewpoint of the 
Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe that 
“[p]rohibition of the burqa and the niqab will not liberate oppressed 
women, but might instead lead to their further exclusion and 
alienation in European societies.”191  The court also refused to follow 
the Supreme Court of Spain, which found a veil ban unconstitutional 
because of the voluntary nature of the full-face veil.192  In that case, 
the Spanish court found that it was not possible to restrict a 
constitutional freedom based on the mere supposition that women 
who wore veils did so under duress.193  The Spanish court concluded 
that the limitations in question could not be regarded as necessary in 
a democratic society.194  
Lastly, the court that adjudicated the French full-face veil ban paid 
no heed to academic legal writings that cautioned that a ban on the 
wearing of the full-face veil would result in isolating the same 
women it was meant to protect, and it would “[t]hus be incompatible 
with the objective of ensuring the social integration of groups of 
immigrant origin.”195 
In justifying its decision, the court cited Sahin v. Turkey, in which 
the ECHR found that Turkey’s law banning headscarves in 
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universities did not violate the Convention.196  Unlike most domestic 
courts, the ECHR is not bound by its prior decisions (i.e., they have 
no precedential value).197  However, in an empirical study of ECHR 
decisions, Yonatan Lupu and Erik Voeten argued that the ECHR uses 
prior decisions much in the same way as U.S. courts as well as other 
common law courts do.198  Moreover, even though it cites prior 
decisions, the ECHR does so without consideration of the country’s 
context.199  
The court cited Sahin seventeen times in its decision on the French 
veil ban.200  Each time the court referred to Sahin, it was for 
propositions that ultimately supported its legal conclusion in favor of 
France.201  For example, in citing Sahin as well as other cases, the 
court notes that “[i]n democratic societies, in which several religions 
coexist within one and the same population, it may be necessary to 
place limitations on freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs in 
order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that 
everyone’s beliefs are respected.”202  The court again cites Sahin to 
support the view that restrictions on religious garb do not violate 
Article 9 of the Convention.203   
Moreover, even though the court extensively referred to Sahin in 
the opinion in which it held the French veil ban did not violate the 
Convention, it did not once distinguish the political and social 
context of Turkey from that of France.204  Its failure to specifically 
articulate the differences between the French context and the Turkish 
context is even more surprising given that the court specifically noted 
in its opinion that context matters in adjudicating bans on behavior in 
the name of women’s rights.205  
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In Sahin, the ECHR found that Turkey’s ban of headscarves only in 
universities was necessary to protect the “rights and freedoms of 
others” and the “protecting [of] public order.”206  The court agreed 
that “[i]mposing limitations on freedom in this sphere may, therefore, 
be regarded as meeting a pressing social need by seeking to achieve 
those two legitimate aims, especially since, as the Turkish courts 
stated[], this religious symbol has taken on political significance in 
Turkey in recent years.”207  
Although the ECHR failed to mention it, the circumstances in the 
Sahin case are clearly distinguishable from those in the French full-
face veil ban case.208  The court in Sahin justified its holding on the 
ground that there was evidence that the pressure to veil was in fact 
coming from a rising radical interpretation of Islam.209  Perhaps the 
veil was being used as a way to maintain and perpetuate inequality.210  
Some commentators have also argued that the reason that the Sahin 
court allowed the Turkish veil ban was because the veil was being 
used as a symbol for the radical Islam that was gaining hold in 
Turkey.211  
Karima Bennoune argues that the Turkish ban was appropriate 
because “[e]ven to the extent that for some women, the choice to 
wear a headscarf is their own, and is for them an expression of 
religious belief, this limitation on that choice is necessary in context 
to protect the rights of others.”212  In particular, she notes that “[n]on-
wearers of such garb risk becoming outsiders, seen as not fully or 
equally Muslim.”213  She goes on to say that bans are appropriate in 
public educational institutions because those institutions shape the 
identities of future generations and forge the public consensus about 
gender roles and equality.214 
However, none of these rationales apply in France.  The veil is not 
part of a political discourse between two competing Islamic political 
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groups.215  In France, the ban applies in all public places and is not 
just limited to schools.216  Yet, while the court relied heavily on 
Sahin, it failed to appropriately distinguish the context of the Turkish 
ban from the context of the French ban.217  In addition, where there is 
societal, political, or religious pressure to veil (as in Turkey 
according to the Sahin court), it would seem appropriate for a 
government to desire to counter that pressure for the sake of 
promoting gender equality.218  On the other hand, because so few 
women in France wear the full-face veil or any veil, the dress of a 
certain group of women would not lead other women in French 
society to start veiling themselves, nor is veiling part of the 
mainstream culture.219  It should be noted that the ban in Sahin 
involved headscarves, whereas France banned women from covering 
their face.  While this distinction could have been relevant, it was not 
raised by the court in upholding the French full-face veil ban. 
The court, by relying on the Sahin decision in adjudicating a case 
arising in France, inaccurately tilted the equation towards upholding 
the ban.220  Too much emphasis is placed on one version of gender 
equality.  Furthermore, by relying on the rationale in Sahin, the court 
placed too little emphasis on other motives a woman may have to veil 
in country where she is a member of a minority religion.221 
By making the comparison to Turkey, the court inadvertently 
suggested that the impact of a ban in Turkey would have the same 
benefits (e.g., promoting women’s equality with men) as a ban in 
France.222  By its focus on a case arising in Turkey, the court also 
failed to give weight to the negative consequences the ban would 
have in France’s specific political and social context (e.g., repressing 
minority immigrant women who wish to express their religion as 
distinct from the mainstream secular views).223 
It makes sense that the ECHR should not be bound by its prior 
decisions because it adjudicates cases across many different countries 
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and contexts.224  Depending on the larger social, historical, and 
economic contexts, the court may come out one way in a case from 
one country and reach the opposite conclusion in a case from another 
country with a similar set of facts.225  However, it did not do this in 
S.A.S. v. France; instead the court justifies its legal conclusion by 
referring to the Sahin case, which involved a ban on headscarves by 
Turkey in educational institutions.226  While upholding the ban in 
Turkey may have been perfectly appropriate to further gender 
equality, it should have had little bearing on whether or not a veil ban 
would promote gender equality in France.227  The court’s reliance on 
the Turkish decision suggests that it failed to appreciate how context 
is so crucial in determining whether or not a behavior contravenes 
gender equality or women’s rights.228 
VI. TOWARDS A TRANSNATIONAL FEMINIST APPROACH 
TO BANS ON WEARING VEILS 
Although the type of in-depth analysis necessary to draw a 
conclusion about the women’s rights implications of a veil ban in 
France is beyond the scope of this article, I make preliminary 
observations about how a transnational feminist methodology could 
be deployed to evaluate the French veil ban as well as veil bans in 
other migrant-receiving countries. 
In evaluating a ban on veils in a migrant-receiving country, 
policymakers should not decontextualize.  That is, they should avoid 
using information about practices from one country to evaluate laws 
in their own country.  In Part III, I pointed out the ways in which the 
discussions about the veil ban in France decontextualized.229  I also 
explained how, in evaluating the veil bans, the ECHR was not 
sufficiently sensitive to the fact that a veil ban may promote women’s 
equality in one country, but may have a different result in another 
country.230 
Legislatures, unlike courts, do not articulate the competing rights 
that are at stake in adopting policies, nor do they explain how they 
 
224. European Court of Human Rights, COUNCIL OF EUR., 
http://www.coe.int/t/democracy/migration/bodies/echr_en.asp (last visited Dec. 19, 
2016). 
225. Heider, supra note 109, at 105. 
226. See S.A.S., 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 130. 
227. Heider, supra note 109, at 105. 
228. Cochav Elkayam-Levy, Women’s Rights and Religion - The Missing Element in 
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1175, 
1189–90, 1192 (2014). 
229. See supra Part IV and accompanying text. 
230. See supra Part V and accompanying text. 
2017 The French Veil Ban 231 
 
have reconciled those competing rights.231  French policymakers may 
have thought that the benefits of the ban are that it advances women’s 
equality by prohibiting a practice that they believe to be rooted in and 
causes gender oppression.232  Those perceived benefits then 
outweighed the costs of the ban, which was the prohibition on 
exercising religious beliefs.233   
By decontextualizing, policymakers and voters have overvalued the 
benefits of the ban in France.234  In countries that require the veil by 
law—and even in countries that do not require it by law, but still 
punish uncovered women (e.g., there have been reports of Taliban 
members using sticks to beat parts of women’s bodies that are 
exposed)—wearing the veil impinges on women’s equality rights 
because women have no choice but to wear it.235  Thus, in these 
countries, banning it may enhance gender equality.236  However, this 
does not mean that the veil is oppressive to women who wear it in 
countries such as France, where wearing a veil is not required to be 
worn by law.  Nevertheless, the harms that ensue from mandatory 
veiling in other countries were transposed to discussions about 
legislation in France.237  Therefore, the perceived benefits from 
banning the veil were greater than the actual benefits in France.  
Relatedly, the costs associated with adopting the ban were 
undervalued.  Because many supporters of the ban decontextualized 
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behavior, they thought that women who wore the veil were coerced 
and those who claimed to wear it voluntarily were “duped” by their 
religion.238  By decontextualizing motives, supporters of the ban 
refused to accept Muslim women’s claims that the veil was an 
expression of their religious identity.239  Thus, religious freedom and 
other motives for veiling in France were undervalued.240  By 
contextualizing the ban, migrant-receiving countries and courts 
would make better policy decisions.  They would resist the tendency 
to overvalue the benefits and undervalue the costs of bans on 
women’s behavior.   
Instead of decontextualizing, policymakers and researchers should 
study the context of the migrant-receiving country.  Using empirical 
quantitative and qualitative methods, they should assess the scope of 
full-face veiling in France, the reasons it is undertaken, and should 
take seriously the reasons offered by the women who wear full-face 
veils.  Only through an in-depth study will a clear picture about the 
cross-border practice emerge.  
While decontextualization should be resisted, this does not mean 
that the context where the practice first emerged is not relevant.  The 
practice of veiling is part of a traditional practice in several countries 
in the world.  Information about human rights violations travels 
quickly across the globe, but this information is often filtered through 
sound bites and stereotypes.  Researchers could study one or more 
countries where veiling initially emerged to understand whether (and 
why) it is considered discriminatory or oppressive to women in that 
country.  What is its scope?  What are the relevant social and political 
institutions that give meaning to it as discriminatory? 
Once the practice is understood in these multiple contexts, a 
comparative approach would help focus on factors that explain why a 
practice may be discriminatory or problematic in one context, but not 
in another.  For example, if social custom or pressure exists in one 
country, then a ban on the practice may be more appropriate in that 
country than it would be where the mainstream social mores do not 
favor (or oppose) the practice.  
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A transnational feminist approach to veil bans suggests that courts, 
policymakers, and feminists should be open to the possibility that a 
veil ban promotes equality in some contexts and not in others.241  In 
one country, the veil may be a tool of political and gender repression; 
in another country, it may be an assertion of religious identity of a 
minority.242  Karima Bennoune also suggests that veil bans should be 
evaluated within the context in which they emerge.243  However, in 
the two countries she examined, she felt veil bans were justified.244  
The idea that a practice is contrary to human rights in one context 
and not in another defies the dominant paradigm of the universality 
of rights.  Many feminists and human rights advocates assert that 
veiling is oppressive no matter where the practice emerges.245  Others 
believe that bans violate women’s rights no matter what country 
adopts them.246  For example, Amnesty International objected to the 
ECHR’s failure to find that France’s full-face ban violated the 
European Convention of Human Rights and also objected when that 
same court failed to hold that Turkey’s ban on headscarves in 
universities violated that Convention.247 
However, consider the most extreme case where a country requires 
women to wear some form of veil by law and the practice has 
historically been used as tool of oppression.  If that country passed a 
law prohibiting women from wearing any veil, few would decry the 
new law as a contravention of women’s equality.  Some women in 
that country might argue that the new ban violates their religious 
rights, but the government would have a strong argument that its veil 
ban is part of a larger strategy to combat structural inequality in 
society.  In a country where few women wear the veil, it is less 
plausible that a ban could be appropriate to promote women’s 
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rights.248  A migrant-receiving country might argue that its ban 
promotes the rights of women who would otherwise wear a veil, but 
that argument ignores those same women’s rights to assert their 
religious identity. 
VII.    CONCLUSION 
Lawmakers in migrant-receiving countries sometimes enact 
regulations on immigrant women’s behavior based on perceptions 
that the practice is discriminatory to women in foreign countries.249  
Often this perception about the foreign country itself is distorted.250  
They also fail to appreciate that the impact of the practice could 
change when it is transposed to another country.251  I have shown 
here how some supporters of the face-veil ban in France justified it, 
in part, because the veil is seen as a tool of oppression in other parts 
of the world.252  The transnational feminist perspective calls for 
recognizing and resisting these decontextualized views.253  It also 
recognizes that practices change meaning with context—a practice 
that is oppressive or discriminatory to women in one context is not 
necessarily oppressive or discriminatory in another context.  Finally, 
it calls for an in-depth understanding and comparison of the practice 
in multiple contexts. 
Global migration continues unabated.254  The transplantation of 
people from one country to another has given rise to hotly contested 
questions about women’s human rights.  Veil bans, as well as other 
bans, are being considered and debated in migrant-receiving 
countries around the world.255  Canada, for example, recently banned 
the full-face veil in citizenship ceremonies.256  Bans on cross-border 
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practices will continue to be discussed around the world.  The 
“burkini” ban mentioned in the introduction is only one such 
example.257 
While there was little world reaction against France’s full-face veil 
ban imposed in 2010, world opinion railed against the burkini 
bans.258  While French courts as well as the ECHR upheld the full-
face veil ban, France’s highest administrative court has rejected the 
burkini bans.259  Perhaps the negative reaction towards the burkini 
bans may be because they were seen as a direct and unfair reaction to 
the terrorist attacks in France.260  The global denunciation of the 
burkini bans and the relative silence in reaction to the full-face veil 
ban may also have to do with the differences between the 
garments.261  The burkini does not cover the face, and there are 
numerous fashionable iterations of it (some include colors other than 
black).  Additionally, many versions of the burkini are form-fitting, 
and it covers only a woman’s body and hair.262   
On the other hand, a full-face veil covers a woman’s face (except 
her eyes), is black in color, and often associated with a loose, black 
blanket-like covering over the body (known as a “burqa”).263  
Another salient reason for the contrast in the reactions to the two bans 
is that the full-face veil is a traditional piece of clothing associated 
with oppression against women in some countries, unlike the burkini, 
which was invented in 2004 by an Australian designer.264 In this 
article, I have shown that policymakers, feminists, and stakeholders 
erroneously overemphasize the context of foreign countries when 
regulating immigrant behavior in their own country.  Instead, I 
propose a transnational feminist methodology that provides a more 
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nuanced lens to evaluate and resolve the competing women’s rights at 
stake that arise in regulating certain practices of immigrant women.   
 
 
 
